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Troubles Looming for Agreed Framework Implementation
Preface
The Agreed Framework has reached yet another critical juncture. Unlike earlier crises that arose from North Korean actions, though, this juncture arrives courtesy of the Agreed Framework's negotiators, who decided to leave the difficult issues for future discussion and negotiation. Certainly there was short-term gain in this strategy, for it resulted in the groundbreaking document signed in Geneva. The long-term implications of this decision are only now being realized, however, in the current impasse. North Korea has delayed the resumption of inspections that would uncover its previous efforts to separate plutonium, possibly for use in a clandestine nuclear weapons program. Until now that delay has had only some consequence, but further delay will soon impact construction of the light-water reactors (LWRs) being provided to North Korea under the deal. Worse yet, North Korea may not allow the nuclear inspections at all, and the whole deal would be sunk.
To be sure, there have been several critical periods in the history of the Agreed Framework, signed by the United States and North Korea in 1994 to dismantle the latter's existing nuclear program in exchange for the provision of safer, "proliferation-resistant" nuclear power reactors(1). These periods have typically followed provocations by Pyongyang, such as the incursion of one of its submarines into South Korea in 1996 and its missile test-flight over Japan in 1998. Each time implementation of the agreement ground to a halt at the behest of first Seoul, then Tokyo, though after each pause work began anew and the agreement was declared "on track," even though the delays mounted and now the reactors might be complete by 2008 instead of the original target completion date of 2003. The current critical juncture, however, has potentially much greater consequences if not solved. Essentially, despite the millions of dollars spent and years of preparations-including the bulldozing of a small mountain-to ready the reactor site at Kumho, unless Pyongyang allows the inspections that will account for all its plutonium, not just the small amount it previously declared, the reactor project will stop and the agreement could fall apart.
Yet simply pressuring North Korea to resume inspections is unlikely to work and would more likely result in a backlash from Pyongyang. Moreover, the current lack of dialogue between the United States and North Korea creates fewer opportunities to engage Pyongyang on this issue. Recent signals from the North, however, indicate a small opening, particularly if incentives are involved(2). Offers of energy assistance in exchange for cooperation on inspections beyond its current commitments might get the ball rolling.
1.Inspection Problems
The thorn in the side of Agreed Framework implementation has always been inspections. In fact, it was North Korea's failure to allow inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) full access to its nuclear facilities that precipitated the initial crisis in early 1993. The inspectors were attempting to assess the accuracy and completeness of North Korea's declaration of its nuclear activities, a declaration all parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) must make-North Korea became an NPT party in 1985, but did not implement its inspections (or safeguards) agreement until 1992. In late 1992 the IAEA discovered discrepancies in what North Korea had declared and what IAEA inspections uncovered. Specifically, North Korea declared it had separated a small amount, less than 100 grams, of plutonium during a reactor shutdown, but evidence collected during the inspections suggested a greater amount. (U.S. intelligence agencies believed the amount of plutonium to be up to 12 kilograms, enough for perhaps two nuclear weapons.) When North Korea could not adequately explain the discrepancy, the IAEA requested "special inspections" of two waste sites not listed in North Korea's declaration, but visible in satellite photos of the nuclear complex at Yongbyon, in order to clear up the inconsistencies. North Korea refused on the grounds that these were "military sites" and threatened to withdraw from the NPT. Following the intervention of former President Jimmy Carter, the United States and North Korea negotiated and signed the Agreed Framework on October 21, 1994(3).
The agreement provided a political solution to the inspections problem: the IAEA could monitor the freezing and dismantling of North Korea's existing nuclear program, but the difficult inspections to determine the extent of the plutonium separation activities were delayed for several years. For politicians on both sides this delay was beneficial, for it set in motion the process of engagement with North Korea hitherto unprecedented. It also allowed the initial work required by the agreement to proceed without getting bogged down by confrontation and controversy. However, the inspections still must go forward(4).
2. Timeline of Significant Events
Two specific inspections milestones are mentioned in the agreement. First, "Upon conclusion of the supply contract for provision of the LWR project, ad hoc and routine inspections will resume under the DPRK's safeguards agreement with the IAEA with respect to the facilities not subject to the freeze."(5) The supply contract in question was signed December 15, 1995. The second milestone concerns the conclusion of the inspections: "When a significant portion of the LWR project is completed, but before delivery of key nuclear components, the DPRK will come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA...."(6) These two clauses create a window of time in which inspections must be completed. The window opened in late 1995 and it won't close until inspections are complete. Essentially, in order for the reactor project to proceed beyond construction of the reactor buildings, the IAEA must be satisfied that it has a full and accurate picture of North Korea's nuclear program, including the plutonium separation activities.
Pyongyang, however, argues that there is no specific start date for inspections mandated by the agreement, and that only the second milestone matters. North Korea insists it will complete the inspections before delivery of key nuclear components. Furthermore, North Korea believes it has plenty of time to satisfy the IAEA before the "significant portion" of the reactor project is completed. And, why should North Korea allow inspections before it is absolutely certain that the "significant portion" will be delivered, given that the project is already five years behind schedule? Legally, North Korea has the better side of the argument. It is not required to begin inspections until the significant portion is delivered, so it could wait until then to proceed with inspections. Practically, though, this strategy makes little sense, for if North Korea delays the start-date for inspections until the significant portion is delivered, the completion of the reactor project will be set back by three or four years. North Korea should allow inspections to begin soon, despite delays in delivery of the significant portion, so that the LWRs will come online and mitigate North Korea's chronic power shortages in this decade, rather than the next.
North Korea did state in January 1996 that the IAEA could resume inspections at facilities not covered by the Agreed Framework, but thus far it has not allowed the IAEA to use many crucial inspection tools, such as environmental sampling(7). Technical discussions between the IAEA and North Korea continue in Vienna with some progress. In November 2000 North Korea gave the IAEA copies of operating records for the Yongbyon reactor and reprocessing facility(8). More recently, in November 2001, North Korea opened an isotope production laboratory at Yongbyon, which had not been previously inspected, to IAEA inspectors(9). Seventeen rounds of discussions have taken place, though, without indication from North Korea that it will allow the IAEA to implement enhanced safeguards techniques and begin its verification work soon.
In addition to "routine" inspections, there is also the issue of "special inspections." Per the safeguards agreement between the IAEA and North Korea, the agency may make special inspections to verify the information contained in special reports, or if the agency considers that the information provided by the DPRK is not adequate. An inspection is deemed to be special when it is either additional to the routine inspection effort or involves access to information or locations in addition to the access previously specified for ad hoc and routine inspections, or both(10). The last time the IAEA requested special inspections in 1993 North Korea threatened to withdraw from the NPT. That does not mean that North Korea will not be subject to special inspections, however. The Agreed Framework calls for North Korea to allow "ad hoc and routine inspections," as well as "all steps that may be deemed necessary by the IAEA."(11) North Korea also agreed in a confidential minute to the Agreed Framework (the minute is still secret, but has been alluded to by several U.S. officials) that full compliance "included permitting IAEA access to 'additional sites and information' that the Agency may deem necessary to verify the accuracy and completeness of North Korea's initials declaration."(12) Thus, despite its continued intransigence, North Korea has already agreed on several occasions to allow full inspections, both routine and "special" or additional ones.
Clearly the IAEA must have full access to all of North Korea's nuclear facilities to accurately assess the state of the nuclear program, including any nuclear weapons activities. Special inspections, or access to additional sites and information, will be a crucial part of this process and it is therefore important to gain North Korean compliance. So far that compliance has come with a price. In 1998 U.S. intelligence reports concerning a secret facility at Kumchangni, possibly intended for nuclear production or storage, were leaked to the media. The Clinton Administration pressured Pyongyang to allow inspections of these facilities, but North Korea relented only after the United States agreed to provide an additional 500,000 tons of food aid. By the time inspectors visited the facility, many months after the initial press reports, no equipment was found, and reports indicated it had already been removed.(13) The experience at Kumchangni illustrates the importance of special inspections, and the ability of inspectors to investigate when and where they decide, not at Pyongyang's choosing. If North Korea were to amend its original IAEA declaration with a more accurate listing of nuclear facilities and accounting of plutonium separation, however, the issue of special inspections would be moot(14). But until North Korea presents an accurate declaration and grants full access to its facilities, suspicions surrounding a secret North Korean nuclear weapons program will remain.
3. Converging Timelines
What makes the current period critical is that time is running out for the inspections process. If it does not begin soon, there is little chance the reactors could be completed even by the already delayed date of 2008-2009. Given that this is so far in the future it may seem like there is plenty of time yet for North Korea to comply with its obligations. However, this stage of Agreed Framework implementation is a complicated dance, requiring both partners to be in sync to arrive at the desired end. If one partner gets behind the other, the whole dance is thrown off balance. In this case, the partners are the dual processes of inspections and reactor construction.
The Agreed Framework stipulates that North Korea allow a resumption of IAEA inspections following the conclusion of the supply agreement. As noted above, North Korea is not legally required to begin inspections until a "significant portion" of the reactors is complete. Ideally, if inspections had begun in 1996, say, the IAEA most likely would have completed its assessment by now. Under this scenario the conditions for delivery of critical nuclear components would have been met. The reality, however, is that North Korea has not allowed a resumption of the inspections that the IAEA needs to accurately assess North Korea's nuclear activities. This delay risks holding up delivery of the key nuclear components and could jeopardize the entire agreement.
2005 is also the projected start date for delivery of the critical reactor components.(15) The Agreed Framework stipulates that once "a significant portion" of the reactor project is completed and North Korea is in full compliance with its safeguards agreement, the "key nuclear components" will be delivered. The "significant portion" was further defined in the 1995 Supply Agreement, and consists of, among other items, site preparation, conclusion of a reactor contract, delivery of non-essential components like generators and turbines, and construction of the reactor and turbine buildings for the first LWR. According to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), the international body charged with managing the LWR project, excavations for the first main reactor building began in early September 2001. "Another major milestone, the pouring of the 'first concrete,' i.e., the concrete base for the reactor buildings and the auxiliary buildings, is planned in August 2002."(16) Current plans suggest that the "significant portion" might be complete in 2005(17), and delivery of the key components (including pressure vessels, pressure tubes, zirconium tubes, control rods, and coolant pumps) could begin soon after. In fact, the first component to be delivered, the first reactor vessel, is currently under construction in South Korea. With a view toward 2005, KEDO is currently drafting a key nuclear components delivery protocol that will establish a timeline for delivery, and set certain technical hurdles that North Korea must meet. Discussions with North Korea on the draft protocol will begin perhaps in early 2002(18) but could take some time to complete.
In the long run it is important that these dual tracks of inspections and delivery converge around the same time. If the "significant portion" of the LWRs was completed around the same time as IAEA inspections, reactor construction could proceed without delay. More likely, however, is that the "significant portion" will be completed and then languish while North Korea wrangles over inspections. A shutdown at the LWR site would be incredibly costly in terms of labor repatriation and degradation of manufactured components, not to mention the heretofore-untried process of mothballing the facilities. South Korea would bear a particularly large portion of this financial burden. The greatest cost, however, might be political, as support in Seoul and Washington for continuing the LWR project would fade quickly.
4. An Integrated Approach
The analogy of a dance discussed above is somewhat misleading. Although intertwined, there is significant distance between the IAEA-North Korea negotiations on inspections and the KEDO-North Korea delivery process. The only linkage between inspections and delivery listed in the Agreed Framework is that full compliance with IAEA inspection obligations must be met before delivery of the key components begins. This begs the question: given that the two tracks must eventually meet, is it useful for these two processes to be separate? The United States has favored a separate approach, while others, principally South Korea, prefer to integrate the delivery and inspections issues.
Proponents of keeping the issues separate give several reasons. First, there is no language in either the Agreed Framework or the Supply Agreement that provides for linking delivery with progress on inspections, save for the critical component hurdle discussed above. Second, some U.S. officials believe that since there is no official linkage North Korea is unlikely to accept any arrangement that creates milestones for inspections and delivery, particularly given statements from Pyongyang that it will fulfill its Agreed Framework obligations, but not go beyond them. Third, KEDO has no inspections or intelligence-gathering capability, which linking the two issues would require. Last, keeping the issues separate "insulates" the delivery process from the controversy surrounding inspections. This keeps the focus on North Korea's lack of movement on inspections, rather than any problems with delivery, and makes it politically easier for KEDO executive board members to show progress despite occasional obstructionist behavior from the North.
The problem with maintaining the current separation between the issues is that it leaves few options for compelling North Korea to begin the inspections. Given the lack of progress on inspections over the last six years a new approach is needed. The single best argument for integrating inspection milestones in lock step with the delivery schedule, therefore, is that it would bind North Korea to an inspections schedule. Moreover, it would create a specific deterrent against continued North Korea foot-dragging, namely further delays in reactor startup. And, creating a lock-step process would increase the pressure on North Korea incrementally, rather than lumping pressure together once the "significant portion" of the LWR project is complete. This would decrease the chance of another serious inspections crisis.
The goal of integrating these two paths is to ensure that North Korea fulfills its inspection obligations coincident to completion of the "significant portion" of the LWR project. Thus, the delivery milestones that inspections should be linked to are those listed in Annex 4 of the Supply Agreement, which define what "a significant portion" of the LWR project is. For example, the annex lists the following steps that could be used as milestones: delivery of non-nuclear components such as turbines and generators; construction of turbine buildings and other auxiliary buildings; and construction of the reactor building and containment structure.(19) These benchmarks could be linked to the steps in an IAEA inspection plan recently presented to North Korea. According to South Korean officials familiar with the plan, the agency proposed three steps: first, inspect facilities that will continue to operate, such as North Korea's IRT-2000 reactor and other facilities imported from the Soviet Union; second, inspect the frozen facilities, namely the 5 MW reactor and its associated fuel rods, as well as the 50 MW and 200 MW reactors under construction; last, inspect the "other" areas, including a waste disposal facility(20).
5. Linking Inspections and LWR Delivery Milestones
Integrating the delivery and inspections processes would not be easy. It would require long discussions between KEDO and the IAEA in order to match key points in the delivery schedule of non-critical components with key benchmarks for inspections. The most difficult hurdle, however, would be obtaining North Korean agreement on integrating the two. Some evidence of North Korean interest in linkage exists. Noted North Korea expert Selig Harrison presented such an idea to the North Korean Foreign Minister, Paek Nam-Soon, who replied that it was an idea "worthy of consideration."(21) Getting North Korea to agree to anything beyond its Agreed Framework obligations, though, will probably require significant incentives.
If a plan such as this were implemented, it significantly raises the possibility of concurrent progress on both delivery and inspections. Keeping the two tracks separate, however, contains significant risks. The worst-case scenario would be a projection of the status quo several years into the future: continued North Korean stalling on inspections while construction continues. Such a scenario could result in the "significant portion" of the LWR project completed, but without any progress on inspections. In addition to being detrimental to the continuity of the construction process, it would put tremendous pressure on North Korea to allow inspections, which could lead to another crisis like that in 1993. It would also place the United States, South Korea, and Japan in a difficult position: after investing so much in the LWR project it would be incredibly hard to walk away from it, and North Korea could use that leverage to gain additional concessions. Yet, the domestic audiences in each of those countries, pointing to North Korean intransigence, would likely demand that all activities, including the deliver of heavy fuel oil from the United States, cease until North Korea meets its obligations.
Incremental progress on inspections, on the other hand, would give the IAEA and North Korea time to fashion a less adversarial relationship through confidence building. Assuming North Korea will eventually allow inspections, this plan would reduce the pressure on Pyongyang by spreading it out over time. Several non-confrontational inspections might improve the working relationship between Pyongyang and the IAEA, and ease suspicions in the North that the IAEA just gathers intelligence for the United States. It would also go a long way towards averting another inspections crisis. As well, the possibility that North Korea has no intention of allowing inspections that might jeopardize any nuclear-weapon plans it may have must also be acknowledged. Former South Korean Foreign Minister Han Sung Joo, for example, stated recently "I don't believe they'll allow inspection in the near future. They will dig in and make it the topic of another bargain."(22) Linking inspections to delivery would reveal such an intention much earlier than the status quo of no inspections of facilities not associated with the freeze agreement.
6. More Carrot, Less Stick
One of the hiccups surely to be encountered if a linkage plan like that described above were to be negotiated is that it will require North Korea to allow sensitive inspections probably sooner than later. To date Pyongyang has not been warm to any inspections beyond the routine ones conducted by the IAEA to verify that the freeze continues. Attempts to compel inspections have not been very successful, either. U.S. demands to inspect the facility at Kumchangni in 1998 were met with fierce North Korean refusals, for instance. Attempts to compel compliance eventually gave way to offering incentives, essentially rewarding North Korea's stonewalling. In the case of Kumchangni that price was 500,000 tons of additional food aid. The lesson to be taken from the Kumchangni experience is that any North Korean commitments beyond the Agreed Framework, including the linkage plan proposed above, can only be secured through incentives.
The Kumchangni inspections set a bad precedent by ignoring North Korea's commitment, made in its original IAEA safeguards agreement as well as in the confidential minute to the Agreed Framework, to allow full inspections, routine and any additional ones required by the IAEA. There should be no need for additional compensation from the United States or any other country for such inspections. Rather than proceeding with more Kumchangni-like inspections, therefore, it would be more productive to remind Pyongyang of its existing promises and secure its commitment to allowing them in the future. An enhanced inspections framework that resolves these questions and clarifies North Korea's responsibilities vis-a-vis the IAEA, placed in the context of the linkage plan, might be more palatable for officials in Pyongyang, and it would reverse the one-off inspection precedent set with Kumchangni. Such an inspections framework already exists in the form of the IAEA model protocol for enhanced safeguards. The protocol commits states to greater transparency in their nuclear programs and allows the IAEA to use newer inspections techniques that are more accurate, and to focus on suspected clandestine activities through special inspections. So far the United States, China, and South Korea have signed such protocols, and Japan has signed and ratified. North Korean signature of such a protocol, therefore, would not be caving to additional western demands, rather upgrading its membership in the IAEA safeguards regime.
The difficult question is how to gain North Korean acceptance for a package agreement that includes linkage and the IAEA model protocol. The key can be found in Pyongyang's empty coffers, and offers of further energy assistance would be a good carrot to gain its compliance. Plenty of evidence exists to suggest that North Korea might consider some of the above provisions in exchange for energy assistance, such as the provision of small conventional power plants and assistance to upgrade the national grid. First, during the Agreed Framework negotiations North Korea repeatedly requested electricity assistance, particularly help in upgrading its national power grid. At the time, it was estimated that $500 million would be required for such a project. The United States strongly declined to assist with revamping the power grid, arguing that while it would provide heavy fuel oil in the interim, electricity infrastructure was North Korea's problem. Subsequent requests by North Korea to KEDO have produced a similar reply: it is not in KEDO's mandate to provide any electricity assistance beyond the reactor project. Second, North Korea has several times requested electricity by direct transmission from South Korea. The Seoul government has agreed to help, but its request for a study of North Korea's power infrastructure has been rebuffed by Pyongyang. Last, North Korea is demanding energy "compensation" for the delays in implementing the Agreed Framework. All these signs point to North Korea's strong need for electricity, and raise the possibility that energy assistance could be used to induce greater North Korean cooperation(23).
Any energy assistance must be approached cautiously, however. In its recent North Korea Task Force Report, the Council on Foreign Relations correctly argues, "Given the chronic shortages of electricity in North Korea, provision of energy has already become part of the diplomatic equation. By requesting two million kilowatts of electricity from Seoul-exactly the amount of power that the two reactors would provide-Pyongyang has joined the issue... But regardless, any provision of additional electricity to North Korea that is not linked in some manner to the Agreed Framework risks undermining the implementation of the AF [Agreed Framework], as it removes Pyongyang's incentive to cooperate with the IAEA."(24) It was surely this concern that led the United States to pressure Seoul not to provide direct electricity transmission to the North outside of the Agreed Framework context. Similarly, it must be made explicitly clear to North Korea that it has already committed to full IAEA inspections, and that its has leveraged the inspections delay as far as it can: energy assistance will come only following an agreement to integrate delivery and inspections, plus North Korea's signature of the IAEA model protocol, an extension of its current commitments.
7. Ending the Status Quo
To date the Agreed Framework has been a successful non-proliferation tool. North Korea's nuclear weapons program appears to remain frozen, just a little bit shy of a capability to produce enough plutonium for perhaps several nuclear weapons per year. The status quo is fragile, however. North Korean stalling on inspections jeopardizes the reactor project that was offered in return for the freeze. Pyongyang seems stuck, unable or unwilling to move inspections forward. Without further incentive, the inspections may not proceed at all. The plan described above-to link progress on inspections with milestones in delivery of non-critical components of the power reactors, coupled with Pyongyang's signature on a protocol for enhanced IAEA safeguards, all in return for energy assistance-could propel inspections forward. Though the problems in implementing this plan might be difficult, some moves in this direction are required if the Agreed Framework is to survive this critical juncture. Without a timely offer of incentives from the West, there is a significant risk that North Korea will not allow inspections until quite late, meaning more delays in constructing the power reactors.
That is, if the inspections begin at all. There is some risk that if North Korea is not pushed to proceed with inspections, it may try to wiggle through, hoping that KEDO partners will make a political decision to forgive some of the stringency required in IAEA inspections in order to move the process forward. If North Korean hawks believe they can keep their plutonium and have the reactors, too, they will be disappointed. For the United States, the Agreed Framework is primarily a non-proliferation agreement, and if North Korea is not living up to its commitment to remain nuclear weapon free, Washington may decide that engagement has lost its usefulness.
If North Korea is forced to choose between a nuclear weapons program and having power reactors, there is some chance it might choose the former. Implementing a plan such as this, however, would engage North Korea in a manner that is positive, yet persuasive. At least, it would make it more difficult for Pyongyang to choose isolation over engagement. In that sense, greater energy assistance in return for further nuclear nonproliferation commitments might tip the scale enough to ensure that North Korea finally renounces the nuclear weapons option.
(1) The Agreed Framework (Agreed Framework Between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea) requires the United States to organize the provision of light-water reactors for North Korea that will produce 2000 megawatts of electricity upon completion, and to provide 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil annually until the completion of the first reactor to offset North Korean energy shortages resulting from the freeze of its existing nuclear program. In return North Korea agrees to freeze (with international monitoring) and eventually dismantle its existing graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities, as well as come into full compliance with its inspections commitments as a state party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The target date of 2003 was originally set for completion of the reactors, but delays mean that it will now be at least 2008 before they are finished. The agreement is available at www.kedo.org.
(2) Charles Kartman, executive director of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, remarked after a recent visit to Pyongyang, "They were quite obvious in hoping there will be a resumption of dialogue with the United States." Quoted in Don Kirk, "Reactor Program Chief Sees End to an Impasse; North Korea Inspections 'Within Reach,'" International Herald Tribune, December 7, 2001.
(3) For a more detailed timeline and analysis, see David Albright and Kevin O'Neill, ed., Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle (Washington DC: Institute for Science and International Security, 2000); also see the chapter on North Korea in Rodney Jones and Mark McDonough, ed., Tracking Nuclear Proliferation 1998 (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1998), and Verifying the Agreed Framework (Livermore, CA: Center for Global Security Research, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, April 2000).
(4) It should be noted that IAEA inspectors continue to monitor the facilities subject to the freeze agreement. They have not been allowed, however, to conduct the inspections that would verify North Korea's safeguards declaration.
(5) Agreed Framework, Section IV, Article 2.
(6) Agreed Framework, Section IV, Article 3.
(7) For further information see David Albright, "Inconsistencies in North Korea's Declaration to the IAEA," in Albright and O'Neill, Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle.
(8) Mark Hibbs, "IAEA Making Some Quiet Progress In Verification Talks With DPRK," Nucleonics Week, November 2, 2000.
(9) "NK Allows IAEA Inspection of Key Nuclear Institute," Korea Times, December 3, 2001.
(10) "Agreement of 30 January 1992 between the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" Information Circular 403, at the IAEA web site: http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Documents/Infcircs/Others/inf403.shtml.
(11) Agreed Framework, Section IV, Articles 2 and 3.
(12) David Albright and Holly Higgins, "Looking Back," in Albright and O'Neill, Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle, p. 28.
(13) For further discussion of the Kumchangni inspection see Larry Niksch, "North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program," CRS Issue Brief for Congress, February 27, 2001, p. 5.
(14) I thank Mitchell Reiss for this point.
(15) The completion date of the "significant portion" is a constantly moving target. In Testing North Korea, the most recent Council on Foreign Relations Task Force Report on North Korea, the authors suggest "the first half of 2004" (p. 35), but others, including State Department official Gary Samore, suggested that 2005 is a more likely date (see his remarks at the 2001 Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference at www.ceip.org/npp).
(16) "KEDO Spokesman Disputes Alleged 'Meager' Nuclear Site Progress," Letter to the Editor by KEDO Spokesman Marc Vogelaar, JoongAng Ilbo English Edition, November 12, 2001, p. 3.
(17) KEDO officials will not publicly discuss dates for completion of the significant portion, but most experts believe that 2005 is the likely date. See footnote 14 above for further discussion.
(18) "KEDO, NK to Begin Talks for Delivery of Core Parts," Korea Times, October 3, 2001.
(19) From the Supply Agreement (Agreement on Supply of a Light-Water Reactor Project to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea Between the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization and the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea), Annex 4, Articles 5-7, available at www.kedo.org.
(20) Oh Young-hwan, "3-Step Nuclear Inspections," JoongAng Ilbo English Edition, December 10, 2001.
(21) At the Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference in June 2001 Harrison outlined a similar linkage of inspections and delivery, and reported on a trip to Pyongyang, during which Minister Paek made the remarks quoted above. While the linkage aspect of what is proposed here is similar to Harrison's idea, he raised the possibility of additional inspections like Kumchangni, which is rejected here in favor of inducing North Korea to accede to the IAEA model protocol. His remarks can be heard on the conference website at www.ceip.org/npp.
(22) Quoted in Kirk, "Reactor Program Chief Sees End to an Impasse," International Herald Tribune, December 7, 2001.
(23) The Council on Foreign Relations report suggests that the United States and its allies provide electricity by whatever means is most feasible. Additionally, the U.S. could help revamp North Korea's power grid in exchange for reductions in the heavy fuel oil deliveries (Testing North Korea, p. 37f). Although this is probably a good start, it is likely not enough to garner North Korean cooperation. Rather, electricity and power grid rebuilding should come in addition to continued fuel oil delivery. Continued supply of fuel oil is critical for the North Korean economy and for perceptions in Pyongyang that the United States is living up to its end of the bargain. The particulars of direct electricity and power grid assistance are difficult, though. A feasibility study for direct transmission from South to North Korea has not proceeded, so the technical difficulties are not yet fully understood, but are believed by South Korean experts to be many. Some have suggested instead providing small conventional plants that could help with local power supply and would not rely on a national grid for dispersion. A similar technical study of the North Korean grid has also been stymied, although ABB, a Swedish-Swiss company already cooperating with North Korea, has contracted to explore national grid improvements and recently opened an office in Pyongyang. Original cost projections for an overhaul were in the range of $500 million, but are surely higher now. In that regard, the largest hurdle to offering further incentives is financial. Energy assistance will be quite costly, and in a time of global recession is unlikely to be popular. South Korea already bears a large financial burden in the reactor project and its own economy has yet to recover fully from the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Japan, though it contributes less, also has significant economic woes. The U.S. Congress is highly unlikely to authorize further payments to North Korea, especially with the high price of oil driving up costs of heavy fuel oil. Perhaps the most likely partners to contribute are the European Union and Australia. The European Union in particular might be persuaded if ABB would be the prime contractor for power grid upgrades.
(24) Testing North Korea, p. 34.
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